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COMMENTS
EASING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS:
RESTRICTING THE CREATION OF DUTY THROUGH AN
IMPLIED DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
J. GREGORY LENNON
I. INTRODUCTION
As doctors in regions throughout the country are forced to abandon their
practices,' medical malpractice liability issues have reached the forefront of
national debate. Noting this trend, many commentators claim that physicians and
the health care sector are in a crisis. 2 At the heart of this controversy are rising
malpractice insurance premiums. The soaring price of insurance has raised the
cost of medical practice to prohibitive levels. 3 Unable to pay for coverage, many
. J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.A., Political Science,
2002, St. Mary's College of Maryland (St. Mary's City, MD).
1. See, e.g., Addressing the New Health Care Crisis: Reforming the Medical Litigation System to
Improve the Quality of Health Care: Testimony Before the Senate Subcomm. On Labor, Health and
Human Servs., Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2003) (Statement of Claude A. Allen, Deputy
Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs.) (noting physicians are relocating to states with
lower premiums), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t0303I3.html (last revised Mar. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter Addressing the New Health Care Crisis]; MIMI MARCHEV, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE
HEALTH POLICY, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS: OPPORTUNITY FOR STATE ACTION 1
(2002), available at http://www.nashp.org/Files/gnl48_medicalmalpractice.pdf (last visited June 19,
2004) (noting reports of doctors retiring or moving to other states); Edward Hudgins, Doctors Shrug,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at B3 (stating that many physicians are quitting their practices), available
at 2003 WL 7703906; Francis X. Clines, Insurance-Squeezed Doctors Fold Their Tents, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2002, at A24 (quoting Dr. Ahmed D. Faheen, "Practically every day, doctors are leaving.").
2. Eg., Addressing the New Health Care Crisis, supra note I (asserting that the medical liability
crisis is about patients, rather than about doctors, hospitals, or insurance companies); Karen A. Miller,
Confluence Of Technology, Safety Costs, Insurance and Economy has Produced a Health Care
"Perfect Storm, " ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Mar. 28, 2004, at D1 (claiming Pennsylvania's health
care system is facing a crisis), available at 2004 WL 74199196; Joanne Huist Smith & Kevin Lamb,
Women's Health-Care Crisis Looms, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2002 (noting doctors who fear
health care for women in the Miami Valley will reach a crisis within one year), available at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/nw/nw002523.php3 (last visited June 19, 2004).
3. See, e.g., Hudgins, supra note I (noting physicians who have seen the costs of medical
malpractice skyrocket); Miller, supra note 2 (exploring the issues behind the "skyrocketing cost of
medical liability insurance"); Smith & Lamb, supra note 2 (citing increases of insurance rates by 20 to
30 percent in 2000, 37 to 200 percent in 2002, and 60 percent for 2003).
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doctors must leave the profession.4  While the hemorrhage continues, groups
bitterly dispute the cause of the spiking premiums.
5
Recent case law may impact the malpractice debate. In a case of first
impression, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held in Sterling v. Johns
Hopkins Hospital that an implied physician-patient relationship is not created in a
transfer situation when the treating doctor remains free to exercise his own
judgment and diagnosis is complete at the time of the consultation. 6 The Sterling
decision respects the historical bases of medical malpractice jurisprudence while
limiting the creation of a doctor-patient relationship in a transfer situation.
Restricting duty through an implied physician-patient relationship will limit the
malpractice liability of physicians in Maryland, consistent with public policy
objectives to maintain affordable malpractice insurance premiums. Thus,
situations exposing doctors to liability diminish, causing the number of successful
malpractice claims to decrease, and malpractice premiums to decline.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Hybrid Tort/Contract Theory and the Elements of a Medical Malpractice Claim
Originally, "medical malpractice was recognized as a legal wrong before
the rise of negligence as a separate tort and the development of modem contract
principles," 7 but today it is somewhat of a hybrid of contract and tort theories. 8
The bedrock assumption of each theory of liability, however, is that a relationship
exists between the physician and the patient at the time of the injury. 9 This
relationship may arise from either an express or implied contract.'0 In a contract
for medical services, similar to other contexts, a physician has the right to enter
into a consensual relationship with another party of his choosing for mutual
4. See, e.g., Addressing the New Health Care Crisis, supra note I (noting doctors leaving states
like Nevada, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Florida); Hudgins, supra note I (asserting
that physicians are leaving the profession); Clines, supra note I (citing instances of doctors leaving
problem states like West Virginia, New Jersey, Florida, Nevada and Pennsylvania).
5. See MARCHEV, supra note 1, at 5-6 (noting conflicting reports by insurance advocates,
consumer advocates and governmental entities regarding the amounts and causes of rising premiums);
Miller, supra note 2 (listing six factors contributing to the rise in premiums); Smith & Lamb, supra note
2 (citing conflicting reports from consumer groups and insurance groups).
6. 802 A.2d 440, 459 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
7. Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting I LOUISELL &
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, § 8.01 at 8-3 (1998)).
8. See Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (Md. 2000) (cautioning, however, that care must be
taken to keep tort and contract claims separate).
9. James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient Relationships for
Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132, 135-36 (1982).
10. Id. The contractual element between the parties is based on the doctor's promise to "treat the
patient with proper professional skill and the patient will pay for such treatment." Id.
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benefit." A doctor (or patient) may define the terms of employment, and is not
required to accept any individual into his care. 12  Most simply, a contractual
obligation is created when the doctor voluntarily accepts the patient, and
subsequently breaches the contract which gives rise to a cause of action.'
3
Proceeding under a purely contractual theory, however, does not involve
investigation of the doctor's negligence.' 4 Here, the only question is whether the
doctor's performance produced the results promised.' 5 As a result, the contractual
approach is not appropriate in all situations. 16
Although triggered when a contractual relationship has been created, duty
emanates from "[t]he duty of a physician or surgeon to bring skill and care to the
amelioration of the condition" and "has its foundation in public considerations that
are inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling."'17 As embodied in the
Hippocratic Oath," the medical profession mandates that a physician care for his
patients. Courts have found that this obligation creates a fiduciary relationship."9
It is a fiduciary relationship because "[t]he very basis of this affinity is the notion
that the physician is learned, skillful, and experienced in an area of which the
patient knows little, but which is of the most vital importance to him."
20
Therefore, the nature of the relationship involves something more than mere
contractual rights. Thus, modem medical malpractice theory has developed as a
hybrid, incorporating elements of both tort and contract theory.
Writing for the Maryland Court of Appeals in Dingle v. Belin, Judge
Wilner best canvassed the background of the contract/tort hybrid theory.2' In his
11. See DAVID M. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8 (1973) (noting that patients also have a
general liberty to contract).
12. Sharon M. Glenn, Liability in the Absence of a Traditional Physician-Patient Relationship:
What Every "On-Call" Doctor Should Know: Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 747, 753 (1993).
13. HARNEY, supra note 11, at 8.
14. HARNEY, supra note I1, at 8. For this reason, proceeding under a contract claim is preferred
over negligence theory. The doctor may have performed the work to standard, but may not have
completed the procedure in the manner in which the contracting parties had agreed. Further, "the
contract approach, where available, is sometimes chosen over a tort action because of the longer
statutory period during which the action may be commenced." HARNEY, supra note 11, at 8.
15. HARNEY, supra note 11, at 8. (noting that a patient was allowed to recover under a contractual
theory when a dentist installed artificial plates in the plaintiff's mouth that did not meet his satisfaction).
16. See HARNEY, supra note 11, at 8.
17. Rigelhaupt, supra note 9, at 136.
18. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH
694 (5th ed. 1992) (Hippocratic Oath stating "I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients
according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone... In every house where I come
I will enter only for the good of my patients....").
19. Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967).
20. HARNEY, supra note I1, at 6-7.
21. 749 A.2d 157, 164 (Md. 2000).
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opinion, he illustrated how Maryland has approached medical malpractice claims,
stating:
We have long recognized, as have most courts, that, except in those
unusual circumstances when a doctor acts gratuitously or in an
emergency situation, recovery for malpractice 'is allowed only where
there is a relationship of doctor and patient as a result of a contract,
express or implied, that the doctor will treat the patient with proper
professional skill and the patient will pay for such treatment, and there
has been a breach of professional duty to the patient.'
2 2
Furthermore, Judge Wilner highlighted the nexus between tort and contract
liability theory in Maryland, noting "the relationship that spawns the malpractice
claim is thus ordinarily a contractual one." 23 However, tort theory is often used
instead of contract theory because greater damages, usually for pain and suffering,
are ordinarily available.24  Nevertheless, Judge Wilner pointed out that
"malpractice actions have traditionally been tort-based, the tort arising from the
underlying contractual relationship."25 In other words, "a duty of care for the
treatment of an injured party does not arise unless the doctor has expressly or
impliedly accepted that person as his patient., 26
Notwithstanding the contractual theory of recovery, most medical
malpractice claims are founded in tort law.27 As a result, the elements of the
general negligence case apply in the context of Maryland medical malpractice
litigation. 28 The prima facie case for negligence requires: "(I) that the defendant
was under a duty29 to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant
breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that
the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty." 30
In all negligence suits as well as those involving medical malpractice claims, duty
22. Id. (quoting Hoover v. Williamson, 203 A.2d 861, 862 (Md. 1964)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Schaefer v. Miller, 587 A.2d 491 (Md. 1991)).
26. Glenn, supra note 12, at 753.
27. Glenn, supra note 12, at 757.
28. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 247 (Md. 1975).
29. As to the duty element, "United States law, with a few exceptions, does not require one person
to act affirmatively to assist another. Once a person acts, however, he is under a legal duty to act in a
reasonably prudent manner. Thus, even though physicians have no legal duty to counsel their
patients.. .the physician who undertakes to counsel a patient owes a duty to do so non-negligently."
Frederick A. Paola, Physicians, Firearm Counseling, and Legal Liability, 94 S. MED. J. 88, 88 (2001).
30. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 841 (Md. 2001) (original emphasis
omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (Md. 1994).
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is the threshold requirement, and must be established before proceeding to analyze
the other elements. 3' Maryland courts regard duty as a question of law.32
Duty only arises from either an express or implied physician-patient
relationship. 33 In most situations, it is clear that a physician-patient relationship
has been established.34 An example is an express doctor-patient relationship, where
the patient has sought out the physician's services and the doctor provides them to
the individual directly. The creation of a duty, however, becomes difficult to parse
when the plaintiff claims that the duty was created impliedly by the doctor's
actions.
Implied duty is inferred by the courts from the actions of the parties or the
terms of employment.35 A court traditionally regards the doctor's affirmative
action to treat the patient or prescribe a course of treatment as adequate to form a
physician-patient relationship. 36  The question then becomes, what is an
affirmative action on the part of the doctor indicating s/he accepted the individual
as a patient? It is not usually enough to create an implied relationship where
"[t]here may have been some interaction between the patient and the physician, for
example, a telephone call . . . ." But, where a physician is consulted by the
treating doctor the situation must be scrutinized to determine "whether the second
physician's participation creates a professional relationship between that physician
and the patient."38 It is not surprising then, that the investigation of whether duty
was created can be a highly fact specific inquiry. 39 Often, a court will closely
examine the terms of the physician's employment (usually the doctor's on-call
status is in dispute), or what the parties said in the course of the patient's
treatment.40
Duty Not Created Through an Implied Physician-Patient Relationship
Throughout the course of a patient's treatment, the treating doctor may
contact other doctors for advice, an opinion, or a prescriptive plan without creating
31. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 444 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
32. Id. at 445.
33. Id. at 445-46.
34. WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 162 (5th ed. 1998).
35. See Sterling, 802 A.2d at 455 (noting that a physician-patient relationship may be implied
"where the doctor takes affirmative action to participate in the care and treatment of a patient.").
36. Id.
37. CURRAN ETAL., supra note 34, at 162.
38. CURRAN ETAL., supra note 34, at 162.
39. But see Sterling, 802 A.2d at 445 (noting that whether a duty existed is a question of law).
40. Id. at 455-58 (scrutinizing Dr. Gray's deposition testimony to determine the relationship
between Dr. Gray, Dr. Khouzami, and Ms. Sterling).
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a duty. Even in this context, creation of a duty for a medical malpractice cause of
action based on negligence theory still requires the existence of a physician-patient
relationship."' The creation of a physician-patient relationship through either a
telephone call made to a physician for the purposes of consultation 2 or the
doctor's on-call status at the time of the injury is relevant to the Sterling transfer
situation. 3
Affirmative acceptance of a patient does not occur through informal
consultation between doctors. In Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, the
Appellate Court for Illinois held that a physician-patient relationship was not
established when the treating physician merely telephoned another doctor to ask
his opinion about the proper diagnosis and that doctor suggested a course of
treatment without committing himself further to the patient.44 The treating
physician in Reynolds believed her patient, a young boy who had fallen from a
sofa, had an infectious disease but telephoned a colleague because she was
unsure. The second physician, Dr. Fulbright, a staff member of the hospital,
suggested that a spinal tap be performed to determine the source of the infection. 6
During the course of the conversation, Fulbright made no other comments
regarding the treatment of the patient, nor did he agree to see the patient at a later
time.47
The Illinois court held that the telephone conversation did not create a
physician-patient relationship between Fulbright and the boy because Fulbright
"did nothing more than answer an inquiry from a colleague. 4 8 A duty arises only
when the doctor consents to accepting the individual as a patient,49 and no aspect
of the conversation indicated that Fulbright had agreed to take the boy under his
41. Reynolds v. Decatur Mem'l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
42. Id. at 239; Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Irvin v. Smith, 31
P.3d 934, 951-52 (Kan. 2001).
43. Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331,
333 (Va. 2001).
44. 660 N.E.2d at 236.
45. Id. at 237.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court described the conversation, stating "Fulbright inquired if the child had a stiff
neck. Bonds said she did not know, went to check Kevin's neck, and returned to inform Fulbright that
his neck was stiff. At the end of the conversation Fulbright suggested a spinal tap to determine whether
meningitis, encephalitis, or something similar was involved. Bonds did not ask Fulbright to treat Kevin,
nor did Fulbright commit himself to further involvement with Kevin..." Id.
48. Id. at 239 (noting that Fulbright did not "direct the actions of hospital employees in a telephone
conversation with an emergency room nurse," as in Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866
S.W.2d 32, 39-40 (Tex. App. 1993), a case where a relationship was found to have existed.).
49. Id. (noting there "is a consensual relationship in which the patient knowingly seeks the
physician's assistance and the physician knowingly accepts the person as a patient.... A doctor who
gives an informal opinion at the request of a treating physician does not owe a duty of care to the
patient whose case was discussed.").
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care. 50 Hospital rules concerning the protocol for telephone consultation between
two physicians were also of no avail to the plaintiff.5' Consequently, the telephone
consultation between the treating physician and Dr. Fulbright did not create a
physician-patient relationship because Fulbright only provided an informal
opinion.
52
Telephone conversations between doctors with different areas of expertise
also do not necessarily create a doctor-patient relationship.53  A telephone
conversation between an attending general practice emergency room physician and
a specialist who gives a specific opinion does not create a physician-patient
relationship, even though the attending doctor would not have overridden the
specialist's advice.
54
In Corbel v. McKinney, the attending doctor telephoned a specialist colleague
to discuss a patient's symptoms. Mrs. Corbett arrived at Missouri Baptist Medical
Center and was seen by emergency room physician Dr. Ockner.55 Acting on the
advice of the patient's regular physician, Dr. Ockner contacted the defendant, an
ear, nose, and throat specialist.56 Regarding the content of the conversation, "Dr.
Ockner testified that he called defendant as a consultant, presented the information
from [the] patient's medical chart to him, that defendant mentioned that he had a
case or two like it in the previous week and that 'this is usually a viral illness.'
57
Corbett became deaf as a result of the improper diagnosis. 58 Ockner also testified
that he made the diagnosis, but would not have overridden the advice of the
specialist.
59
The Corbet court referred to the reasoning of Lopez v. Aziz, where no
physician-patient relationship was established because "[n]othing in the record
suggests that either doctor contemplated that [defendant's] comments were binding
50. Reynolds, 660 N.E.2d at 239.
51. Id (holding "the rules of the Decatur Memorial Hospital are not dispositive in this case. Such
rules are more appropriately considered in determining whether the standard of care was met."). The
hospital rules governing consultations between physicians required that,
Appropriate consultation shall be obtained by practitioners in cases in which the patient is not a
good medical or surgical risk and in cases in which the diagnosis is obscure, where there is
doubt as to the best therapeutic measure to be utilized, or where the treatment is difficult and
especially in cases with probable disorders or complications lying within a field other than the
one in which the attending physician is primarily qualified.
Id at 238.
52. Id. at 239.
53. Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
54. Id. at 170 (citing Hill by Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990),
and Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Tex. App. 1993).
55. Id. at 168.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Corbett v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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on [the treating physician] or that [defendant] had any authority or responsibility to
control the course of [patient's] treatment. 6 °  Therefore, even though the
emergency room physician may have relied on the specialist's knowledge in
making the diagnosis, a physician-patient relationship had not been established
through the telephone conversation because the attending physician "retained
responsibility for [patient's] care ... weighed [defendant's] advice, and he made a
decision to accept it."
6
'
Courts have also reviewed analogous factual situations when considering a
defendant physician's motion for summary judgment.62  Granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant physician is appropriate when the creation of a
physician-patient relationship is alleged based solely on a telephone conversation
producing an informal opinion.
6 3
In Irvin v. Smith, a neurologist discussed a patient's treatment over the phone
with the attending doctor and agreed to see the patient in the morning. 64 Irvin, a
young girl, was taken to a hospital for treatment of seizures and a high fever,
possibly related to a blockage in her shunt. 65 The treating physician telephoned the
defendant neurologist to determine if a shuntogram 66 was necessary, and the two
doctors agreed that they would perform it the next morning. Before the
procedure was attempted, however, the patient's condition quickly deteriorated and
she suffered severe permanent brain damage.
68
The Supreme Court of Kansas held an implied relationship had not been
established by the telephone conversation because the defendant, Dr. Gilmartin,
"had not examined Irvin, had not reviewed her hospital chart, and had never
spoken with either her or her parents." 69 The only contact between the doctors was
the telephone call, and it was of no consequence that they agreed to treat the
60. Id. at 170 (quoting Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Tex. App. 1993)). The court did
not find the relationship of the doctors conclusive. Although it did not expressly say so, the fact that the
emergency room physician relied upon the specialist's advice in his diagnosis did not create a
physician-patient relationship. Furthermore, the specialist never had any contact with the patient or
received any payment from her. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Corbet v.
McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Co. App. 1998); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. 2001 ).
63. See Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934 (Kan. 2001).
64. 31 P.3d 934, 939 (Kan. 2001).
65. Id. at 938 (explaining that a shunt "is a pump with a tube. The tube extends from the brain to
the abdomen. The purpose of the shunt is to drain excess cerebrospinal fluid from the skull.").
66. Id. at 939 ("a shuntogram is a procedure which involves injection of a radioactive isotope into
the shunt to check for shunt blockage").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 943.
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patient in the morning. 70 Further considering these facts the court said, "[t]here is
no claim that [the defendant] entered any orders in the case or took any other
action other than discussing the case in general terms with Smith and agreeing to
consult the next day. This, by itself, does not create a physician-patient
relationship." 7 ' No facts giving rise to a physician-patient relationship had been
set forth beyond the telephone call. Therefore, summary judgment for the
defendant was appropriate because duty had not been established.72
In addition to cases rejecting the creation of an implied physician-patient
relationship through a telephone call to a doctor, some courts have also held that a
physician-patient relationship is not created through a doctor's "on-call" status.
73
In Oja v. Kin, a hospital admitted a patient who had a severe gunshot wound to the
jaw.74 The treating emergency room physician contacted the on-call ear, nose, and
throat physician, Dr. Kin.75 Defendant Kin refused to come to the hospital because
he was not feeling well. During the conversation, Dr. Kin did not offer any advice
on the course of treatment.76  The patient died after being transferred to another
hospital.
In the opinion, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the on-call status
of the defendant by itself did not automatically create a physician-patient
relationship with the decedent.77 It stressed that "Dr. Kin averred that he told the
emergency room resident that he was ill and that she should contact another
physician. He denied ever accepting the decedent as a patient., 78 As a result,
when contacted and the on-call doctor refuses to see the patient, a plaintiff may not
rely solely upon the on-call status of the doctor to demonstrate that an implied
physician-patient relationship existed.79
70. Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 943 (Kan. 2001).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 942-44.
73. Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331,
333 (Va. 2001).
74. Oja. 581 N.W.2d at 741.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 743. There was some discussion in the opinion about Kin's on-call contract with the
hospital. The court noted that Kin did have an obligation to the hospital to be available during his on-
call tenure. But, the plaintiff could not allege that this obligation created a physician-patient
relationship unless he was intended as a third-party beneficiary. Sua sponte, the court determined that
the patient was not intended as a third party beneficiary, and therefore, on-call status alone was not
enough to confer duty on the defendant. Id. at 743-44.
78. Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
79. Id. The court comprehensively described the landscape of when a relationship may be created
by implication. It explained, "merely listening to another physician's description of a patient's problem
and offering a professional opinion regarding the proper course of treatment is not enough. Under those
circumstances, a doctor is not agreeing to enter into a contract with the patient. Instead, she is simply
offering informal assistance to a colleague. At the other end of the spectrum, a doctor who is on call
2004]
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Finally, the creation of a doctor-patient relationship through on-call status has
also been considered in the context of teaching hospitals.8 0  On-call status at a
teaching hospital does not create a physician-patient relationship, even when the
on-call doctor is supervising residents, when the treating resident does not
communicate with the on-call doctor about the patient, and the on-call doctor does
not provide direct medical services.
8
'
In Prosise v. Foster, no discussion took place between the on-call physician
and the resident on duty. 82  Dr. Foster was on-call at the Medical College of
Virginia Hospital Pediatric Emergency Room when four-year-old Crystal Prosise
was examined. 83  First-year resident Dr. Narang treated Prosise and sent her
home.8 4 The next day, Prosise returned to the hospital under the direction of her
pediatrician and was examined by Foster.8 5 Concluding Narang's initial diagnosis
and treatment for dehydration was incorrect, Foster determined Crystal had a type
of chicken pox that affected the entire body, and altered the course of treatment.
86
Foster's change in treatment was too late; Prosise died from the symptoms a few
weeks later.87
Following the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Rivera v. Prince
George's County Health Department,8 the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
physician-patient relationship was not established merely as a result of on-call
status.89  Even though the defendant was on-call at a teaching hospital and
responsible for supervising residents, she was never contacted regarding the initial
course of treatment. 90 Articulating the basis of its holding, the court said "Dr.
Foster's direct actions do not indicate that she accepted Crystal as a patient ....
She did not treat Crystal, she did not participate in any treatment decisions ... and
she was not consulted [by the attending physicians or other hospital staff.]" 9'
Therefore, on-call status alone is not sufficient to create a physician-patient
relationship even in a teaching hospital where a doctor is responsible for
residents.92
and who, on the phone or in person, receives a description of a patient's condition and then essentially
directs the course of that patient's treatment, has consented to a physician-patient relationship." Id.
80. Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331 (Va. 2001).
81. ld. at 334.
82. Id. at 332.
83. Id. at 331-32.
84. Id. at 332.
85. Id.
86. Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331, 332 (Va. 2001).
87. Id.
88. 649 A.2d 1212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
89. Prosise, 544 S.E.2d at 334.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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The Creation of Duty Through an Implied Physician-Patient Relationship
Some courts have charted a competing fleet of cases, finding a physician-
patient relationship is created under similar factual circumstances. 93 The North
Carolina Supreme Court, in Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, held that
the doctor responsible for supervising residents owes a duty to patients treated by
those residents while he is on-call.
94
In Mozingo, the on-call physician was supervising residents from his
house, ready to take calls from residents if they had questions.95 A resident
contacted the doctor when Mrs. Mozingo's baby's shoulder became lodged in her
pelvic cavity during birth. 96  The on-call physician immediately came to the
hospital, but the baby had already been born suffering severe and permanent
97injuries.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that because the defendant
"knew the residents at the Hospital were actually treating patients when he
undertook the duty to supervise the residents as an on-call supervising physician,"
the defendant owed a duty to the patients under his residents' care. 98 In the
opinion, the court concentrated on the defendant's stipulation99 that he had
"responsibility for supervision of the OB/GYN residents and interns at the time of
the birth" and therefore, had a duty to ensure that the residents were practicing
medicine in a non-negligent fashion 00 Consequently, a competing line of cases
was born holding an on-call physician owes a duty to patients under the care of his
supervised residents.
Subsequent cases have been decided based on the theory of on-call liability
set forth in Mozingo.l01 Attempting to set up clear guidelines in a case of first
93. Mozingo v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1992); Wheeler v. Yettie
Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App. 1993).
94. Mozingo, 415 S.E.2d at 346-47.
95. Id. at 342.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 342-43.
98. Id. at 344-45, 47.
99. Id. at 344. The Supreme Court of North Carolina used the defendant's stipulation and weighed
it heavily against him. It noted "[s]tipulations are viewed favorably by the courts because their usage
tends to simplify, shorten, or settle litigation, as well as save costs to litigants." Id. (quoting Pelham
Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Transp., 279 S.E.2d 826, 830 (N.C. 1981)).
100. Mozingo v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341, 344-45 (N.C. 1992) (stating that
"a physician who undertakes to provide on-call supervision of residents actually treating a patient may
be held accountable to that patient, if the physician negligently supervises those residents and such
negligent supervision proximately causes the patient's injuries.").
101. See e.g McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Lownsbury v. Van
Buren, 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 2002); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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impression, in McKinney v. Schlatter, the Court of Appeals of Ohio established a
three prong test where,
a physician-patient relationship can exist by implication between an
emergency room patient and an on-call physician who is consulted by
the patient's physician but who has never met, spoken with, or consulted
the patient when the on-call physician (1) participates in the diagnosis of
the patient's condition, (2) participates in or prescribes a course of
treatment for the patient, and (3) owes a duty to the hospital, staff or
patient for whose benefit he is on call.1
0 2
In other words, if an on-call doctor has a pre-existing duty to the hospital,
duty is created when a health care professional contacts him regarding treatment
and the doctor offers an opinion.
10 3
In McKinney, the treating physician contacted the on-call cardiologist
about a patient who arrived complaining of chest pains. 104 The cardiologist
determined that the ailment was probably not cardiac in nature. 10 5 Consequently,
the treating physician released the patient, and the patient died a few hours later.'
0 6
Using the three prong test, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
directed verdict for the defendant physician. The court noted a jury could find a
duty where, despite not meeting or speaking with the patient, the on-call
cardiologist diagnosed the ailment as non-cardiac and participated in the course of
treatment by prescribing specific tests to be performed. 10 7 In its analysis, the Court
of Appeals of Ohio acknowledged that it was expanding medical malpractice
liability, but considered it necessary for public policy reasons.'
0 8
Perhaps realizing that the bright-line rules established in McKinney
expanded medical malpractice liability too far, the Supreme Court of Ohio
overruled the three prong test in Lownsbury v. VanBuren.10 9 In Lownsbury, the
court found that a reasonable jury could conclude the requisite relationship had
arisen between a supervisory doctor at a teaching hospital and a patient."
0
102. McKinney, 692 N.E.2d at 1050.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1046.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1047.
107. Id. at 1050-51.
108. McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that "[t]o
find otherwise would allow on-call cardiologists and kindred specialists who, with a duty to do so,
provide what one could term 'indirect medical care' to escape all liability even after rendering a
diagnosis and prescribing a course of treatment"). Id.
109. 762 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Ohio 2002).
110. Id. at 362-63.
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Therefore, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant was improper.'
Through his contractual agreement to supervise residents, the doctor assumed a
duty to patients treated by the resident physicians." 2 The residents performed a
test on the patient rather than immediately sending her to the labor induction unit
per the supervisor's request, and a child was born with serious birth defects as a
result.' 13
Even though it abandoned the three prong test, the court in Lownsbury
affirmed the principle that duty may be implied through the actions of the doctor.
Striking at the heart of the definition of when duty is created, the court noted "[t]he
basic underlying concept in these cases is that a physician-patient relationship, and
thus a duty of care, may arise from whatever circumstances evince the physician's
consent to act for the patient's medical benefit."" 4  Furthermore, the court
instructed that "physicians who practice in the institutional environment may be
found to have voluntarily assumed a duty of supervisory care pursuant to their
contractual and employment arrangements with the hospital.""'  The three prong
test, however, was flawed because it "subsume[d]" the ultimate question of duty." 6
A physician-patient relationship was present here because the doctor was "actively
involved"" 17 in caring for the patient through his supervisory role at an institutional
hospital. Therefore, although the court abandoned the three-prong test, it left in
place the principle from McKinney that a physician patient relationship may exist
without any direct contact between the patient and the doctor.
Just as courts have found that a duty may be created while a doctor is on-
call, affirmative acceptance of a patient occurs when the doctor directs the action
of the treating nurse. 1 8 In Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Memorial Hospital, a duty
arose when a nurse telephoned the on-call doctor who evaluated the status of a
pregnant woman requesting transfer to another facility. A nurse telephoned a staff
doctor to describe the patient's symptoms, and the physician approved the
transfer. " 9 While the patient was en route to John Sealy hospital, labor began with
I11. Id. at 364.
112. See id. at 363.
113. Id. at 355-56.
114. Id. at 360.
115. Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354, 360 (Ohio 2002) (holding that "a physician-patient
relationship can be established between a physician who contracts, agrees, undertakes, or otherwise
assumes the obligation to provide resident supervision at a teaching hospital and a hospital patient with
whom the physician had no direct or indirect contact.") Id. at 362.
116. Id. at 362.
117. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 449 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (quoting
Lownsbury v. VanBuren). The Sterling court spends much time placing the Lownsbury decision within
the context of McKinney and other medical malpractice cases. Id. at 448-49.
118. Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'I Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 40 (Tex. App. 1993).
119. See id. at 35 (Although the doctor had approved the transfer, the EMTs who were transporting
the patient expressed concern about whether Wheeler was stable enough to transport. The nurse at
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numerous complications. 120 The baby suffocated and was delivered still-born.' 2 '
Focusing on the telephone call from the nurse, the court held that the defendant
doctor had a duty to Mrs. Wheeler and her child because he analyzed her
symptoms, made a medical determination, and prescribed transfer as part of the
course of treatment. 122  In this situation, the court believed that the doctor's
telephone instructions to transfer the patient indicated an affirmative act, whereby
the doctor was accepting the individual as a patient.
23
Leading Maryland Cases
Few Maryland cases have considered when an implied physician-patient
relationship gives rise to duty. There are, however, two cases upon which the court
in Sterling rested its analysis. 1
24
A more dated approach to medical malpractice law, Thomas v. Corso,
found a physician patient relationship existed between an on-call doctor and a
patient when the doctor prescribed a course of treatment and the doctor had
responsibility for newly admitted patients while on-call. 125 In Thomas, the patient
was brought to the hospital after being struck by a car.' 26 The attending nurse
telephoned the on-call doctor, who prescribed a course of treatment from home
because he believed the symptoms did not demonstrate any sense of urgency.
127
Over the next several hours, the patient's blood pressure lowered and he eventually
died.' 28 The Court of Appeals found that the doctor had a duty to the patient
because a physician-patient relationship had been created when the doctor took the
individual under his care and outlined a specific manner of treatment for the
patient's symptoms.129
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has since departed from the
reasoning in Thomas, restricting a doctor's liability to the terms of his on-call
Yettie Kersting "instructed [the EMTs] to 'put the patient in the ambulance, turn on the lights and sirens
and go."') Id.
120. Id. at 36 (noting that "the fetus was not coming out of the birth canal .... Several minutes
later, the baby, a boy, presented in a frank breech position (buttocks first). He was delivered up to the
neck with good color and extremities moving, at which point Mrs. Wheeler's cervix clamped down
around the baby's neck... and the birth process stopped.").
121. Id.
122. Id. at 40.
123. See id. Although the court did not expressly use the phrase "affirmatively act," a duty arises
when the doctor accepts the individual as a patient. Acceptance of a patient is implied when the doctor
takes definite steps toward caring for the individual. Id. at 37-40.
124. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
125. Thomas v. Corso, 288 A.2d 379 (Md. 1972).
126. ld. at 382.
127. Id. at 383, 385.
128. Id. at 384.
129. Id. at 383, 388.
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agreement. Diverging from the Mozingo line of cases,' 30 the Court of Special
Appeals' holding in Rivera v. Prince George's County Health Department is
instructive:
Unless the 'on call' agreement between a hospital and a physician
provides otherwise, an 'on call' physician who has not accepted a
patient or has not, pursuant to his 'on call' status, consulted with a
treating or attending physician in regards to the patient, or has not been
summonsed pursuant to his 'on call' agreement to consult with an
attending physician or attend or treat a patient, is not liable for the
negligence of others during the 'on call' but unsummonsed period. 13'
In Rivera, Dr. Oh was on call at a Prince George's County medical facility.'
32
The plaintiff had come to the facility on prior consecutive days for treatment of
pregnancy complications. 133  On September 8, 1978, the plaintiffs baby was
delivered by residents at the facility. 134 Apparently, during the pregnancy (but
before delivery) the mother had developed an infection in her uterus, which led to
the child being born mentally retarded. 35 Because Dr. Oh was on-call the day the
baby was delivered, the mother claimed that he was negligent in fulfilling his on-
call duties to the facility and liable for damages. 1
36
The Court of Special Appeals held that no physician-patient relationship
existed between the parties because, prior to the injury, Dr. Oh did not examine or
prescribe a course of treatment for the patient and was not contacted by any of the
residents. 137 Distinguishing Thomas, the Court pointed out that Dr. Oh fulfilled his
130. See Rivera v. Prince George's County Health Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212, 1225 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994). ("[tlhe duties of'on call' physicians have not heretofore received significant appellate attention.
There is only one case of which we are aware in Maryland where an 'on call' doctor was found to have
been negligent 'in his response to a call.'... One state, North Carolina, has addressed the issue in at least
one case in both the intermediate appellate court and the Supreme Court of that State. Both courts
adopted a broad definition of the duties and liabilities of physicians 'on call'....We find, however, the
logic of the dissents in those cases to be more persuasive.").
131. ld. at 1232.
132. Id. at 1215.
133. Id.
134. Rivera v. Prince George's County Health Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212, 1215 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994).
135. Id. ("The minor appellant was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from severe mental
retardation caused by 'hypoxia,' a condition where an infection invades the uterus and deprives the
fetus of oxygen.").
136. Id. at 1214-15, 1225.
137. Id. at 1225. The Court of Special Appeals examined the on call agreement and found that Dr.
Oh abided by its terms. The Court noted the weakness in the plaintiffs case and stated that "all Dr. Oh
was required to do under his agreement and arrangement with the Hospital, at all times relevant to the
case at bar, was to be 'on call.' When called upon, he then assumed his duties, i.e., to consult with,
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on-call duties and responded promptly when the call was eventually made, while
Dr. Thomas took three hours to arrive at the hospital. 3 8 Therefore, by explicitly
diverging from Mozingo, the Court of Special Appeals in Rivera required the
doctor's on-call agreement with the hospital expressly impose liability on the
doctor, the doctor participate in diagnosing or prescribing a course of treatment
with the treating physician, or the doctor expressly accept the individual as a
patient before a physician-patient relationship is created.
III. STERLING V. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL
The Facts Supporting Sterling's Malpractice Claim
Nearly 33 weeks into her pregnancy,' 39 Ms. Sterling was suffering from
several symptoms including nausea, vomiting, borderline blood pressure,
proteinuria, 4 °  edema, 14 ' hypertension, and abdominal pain. 142  On
recommendation from her personal physician, Laverne Sterling was admitted to the
Peninsula Regional Medical Center 43 on August 2, 1993.44 The following day,
her condition worsened considerably.' 45  In addition to her existing conditions,
Sterling developed hematuria and bleeding in her mouth. 146  The treating
physician, Dr. Floyd Gray, administered several tests, 47 and around 12:30 pm, he
advise, and attend the residents. The evidence is clear that he did just that when called. The damage,
however, had already occurred to appellant by the time the residents contacted him." Id.
138. Id. at 1231.
139. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 442 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (stating that,
when admitted, Ms. Sterling was exactly 32.6 weeks pregnant).
140. Id. (defining proteinuria as the presence of protein in the urine).
141. Id. (defining edema as swelling due to fluid retention).
142. Id.
143. The PRMC is an urgent care center located on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, a rural area.
According to the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging, health care services in
rural areas are faced with many challenges; they tend to be small, lack significant funding and
resources, and have difficulty in attracting qualified medical professionals when compared to large
urban hospitals. Statement of the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, Jun. 12, 2001, available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/health/l07cong/6-12-01/records/aahs.htm (last visited June 19,
2004).
144. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 442.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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conclusively diagnosed Sterling with severe pre-eclampsia 148 and HELLP
syndrome. 1
49
Because Sterling's symptoms qualified her condition as a "high risk"
pregnancy, Dr. Gray decided that it would be best to transfer Ms. Sterling to a
hospital that would be better able to treat her condition. 50 Following protocol, Dr.
Gray contacted the Emergency Medical Resource Center, which provides referral
services in emergency medical transfer situations.' 15  The referral service
instructed Dr. Gray to contact Johns Hopkins Hospital, 152 a designated "High-Risk
Maternal Consultation/Referral Service" that was equipped with the resources and
facilities to treat Ms. Sterling's severe, potentially life-threatening condition.1
53
To facilitate a possible transfer, the referral service put Dr. Gray in contact
with Johns Hopkins Hospital. 154 Speaking with resident Dr. Erica Leventhal, Dr.
Gray explained Sterling's symptoms and that he had placed Sterling on a
magnesium sulfate drip.' 55 This information was given to the on-call physician,
Dr. Khouzami, who called Dr. Gray to discuss the transfer further.' 56  In
accordance with MIEMSS 157 transfer protocol, Dr. Gray described his diagnosis of
severe pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome, and that Sterling was receiving a
magnesium sulfate drip.' 58  He further explained the earlier tests he conducted
which led to his diagnosis. 159 After their discussion, Dr. Khouzami recorded the
information in the Hopkins Maternal Transport Log and determined that it was
148. Id. (citing STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1419 (26th ed. 1995), the court
characterized severe pre-eclampsia as "a serious complication of pregnancy." The disorder is described
as including "hypertension with proteinuria or edema, or both...." Id. n.2.
149. Id. (citing Maureen O'Hara Padden, HELLP Syndrome, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Sept. 1, 1999, at
829, the court defined HELLP syndrome as "a syndrome characterized by hemolysis, elevated liver
enzyme levels, and low platelet count." Id. n.2.
150. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 442.
151. Id. at 442 n.3. Emergency Medical Resource Center "is a referral service established in 1978
by the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) through the
Departments of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Johns Hopkins Hospital and University of Maryland
Hospital. The service was created to provide a coordinated maternal transport system to reduce
morbidity and mortality." Id. at 442 n.3.
152. Id. at 442.
153. Id. at 442 n.4 (noting that the designation was created in order to improve medical care for
pregnant women).
154. Id.
155. Id. (stating that Dr. Gray told Dr. Leventhal that Sterling was experiencing hypertension,
hematuria, proteinuria, elevated liver enzymes, severe abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting). Id.
156. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 442-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). Dr.
Khouzami telephoned Dr. Gray and they determined that a transfer was necessary. MIEMSS protocol
was followed throughout the procedure. Id.
157. See supra note 151 defining MIEMMS.
158. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 443.
159. id.
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appropriate to transfer Ms. Sterling to Hopkins for treatment.' 60  Although Dr.
Gray initially wanted Ms. Sterling taken to Baltimore by helicopter, MEIMSS
procedure called for transport by ambulance and the two doctors agreed that this
course should be taken.'
6
'
During transfer to Hopkins via ambulance, Ms. Sterling became
unresponsive.' 62 The ambulance then changed course for Memorial Hospital in
Easton.163 While at the hospital, doctors found Ms. Sterling had experienced an
intraventricular hemorrhage and an emergency cesarean section was necessary to
save the child. 164  After the cesarean section, Ms. Sterling was airlifted to
University of Maryland where she died from the hemorrhage. 165  A medical
malpractice suit followed Ms. Sterling's death, naming Dr. Gray, PRMC, and
Johns Hopkins as defendants. 166 Johns Hopkins argued in a motion for summary
judgment that the plaintiff failed to establish a physician-patient relationship
between the decedent and the Hopkins physician, and therefore, Hopkins was
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 16 7 The circuit court accepted this
argument, and denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. 168 Plaintiff then
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
169
Sterling at the Court of Special Appeals
In a case of first impression, 170 the Court of Special Appeals found that Johns
Hopkins did not owe a duty to Sterling because a physician-patient relationship
had not been created through a telephone conversation regarding transfer of a
patient.' 7' In the opinion, the court investigated case law outside of the state,172
moved to a discussion of relevant Maryland cases,173 and finally analyzed the
160. Id.
161. id. "Dr. Gray requested that Sterling be transferred via helicopter. At the hearing below,
plaintiffs' counsel represented that the 'decision to transport, the medical decision made by Dr.
Khouzami, was a deviation in the standard of care.' Counsel for Johns Hopkins argued that under
MEIMSS protocol at this time pregnant women who were receiving IV. magnesium sulfate could not
be transferred by helicopter." Id. n.5.
162. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 443. Ms. Sterling was transferred by a local ambulance company. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 441.
167. Id. at 443.
168. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 441.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 455-56 ("We are unaware of any case that addresses the liability of a hospital that has
accepted the transfer of a patient without having any direct contact with that patient.").
171. Id. at 443,446.
172. Id. at 449-53.
173. Id. at 454-55.
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creation of duty in the situation at bar. 174 The panel held that because there was no
physician-patient relationship, and thus no duty, the circuit court was correct in
granting summary judgment in favor of Johns Hopkins. 175
The Court Follows the Majority of Jurisdictions
Two competing lines of case law have developed in the context of
determining when a duty arises based on an implied physician-patient
relationship. 176  Consequently, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals was
compelled to select which legal theory to follow. 177 Maryland courts have only
considered a situation involving a patient's indirect contact with an on-call
physician, and have not imposed a duty in any situation involving liability of a
hospital in a transfer situation based on a implied physician-patient relationship. 78
In Sterling, Judge Theime rejected the cases that more easily recognize the creation
of a physician-patient relationship and followed the majority ofjurisdictions which
maintain that an on-call doctor does not have a duty to the patient if he only gives
advice to the treating physician. 79 Although the court heavily cited cases from
outside the jurisdiction, 180 Sterling rests upon Rivera v. Prince George's County
Health Department 81 and Thomas v. Corso to support its analysis. 182  Judge
Theime noted in Sterling that the Court of Special Appeals has recoiled from the
174. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 455-59.
175. Id. at 459.
176. Compare Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Va. 2001), with Mozingo v. Pitt County
Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1992). The Virginia court in Prosise chose not to follow the
North Carolina court in Mozingo. Prosise, 544 S.E.2d at 333-34. Mozingo is generally regarded as the
flagship case in a line of cases which more freely recognize the creation of a physician-patient
relationship.
177. Since Sterling was a case of first impression, the Court of Special Appeals adopted a theory of
implied physician-patient relationships in the context of medical malpractice. Sterling, 802 A.2d at
446, 455-59.
178. See Rivera v. Prince George's County Health Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994).
179. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 459.
180. See id. at 449-53. Although the Court is guided by its previous decision in Rivera, it utilizes
case law from outside the jurisdiction in its analysis. Two examples are Lection v. Dyll, 65 S.W.3d
696, 704 (Tex. App. 2001), where the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Texas court which
stated "[a] physician may agree in advance with a hospital to the creation of a physician-patient
relationship that leaves him no discretion to decline treatment of the hospital's clients," Sterling, 802
A.2d at 455 n.10, and Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. App. 1993), which held that an
implied relationship had not been established when the treating physician was free to accept or reject
the advice of the consulting physician. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 458.
181. Sterling, 802 A.2d. at 454-55.
182. Id.
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Thomas decision, as illustrated by Rivera.183 Relying heavily upon Rivera, he
noted "[i]n the absence of an express agreement, 'on-call' means nothing more
than that."'' 84 A duty was not established in Rivera because "[h]e did not exercise
control over [hospital residents'] actions on a regular basis" and "was merely to be
consulted regarding any complications that the residents encountered in caring for
obstetrical patients."'185 Therefore, the Sterling court rejected Mozingo and its
progeny by extending the logic of Rivera to a physician-patient relationship created
by implication in a transfer situation.
Communication Regarding Transfer Did Not Create an Implied Doctor-Patient
Relationship
Even though the court did not find that a duty by implication had arisen on
behalf of Johns Hopkins, the Sterling opinion nevertheless regarded it as well
settled that a duty may be created by implication "where the doctor takes
affirmative action to participate in the care and treatment of a patient.'' 86 Based on
this principle, the Court of Special Appeals went one step further and held that a
duty of the on-call or transferee doctor is not established "where ... the treating
physician exercises his or her own independent judgment in determining whether
to accept or reject [a consultant's] advice ... the consultative physician should not
be regarded as a joint provider of medical services with respect to the patient." 187
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the relationship between the
treating physician (Dr.Gray) and PRMC, and Dr. Khouzami and Johns Hopkins
Hospital. 88
In his analysis, Judge Theime primarily relied upon the record of Dr.
Gray's deposition to determine the extent to which Gray was acting independent of
Khouzami and Johns Hopkins.' 89 The deposition record of Dr. Gray utilized by the
court is set forth below:
Q: Did you make a diagnosis of severe pre-eclampsia at 10:50,
Doctor?
A: Yes.
183. Id. In describing Rivera, Judge Theime leads into a discussion of Thomas, and indicates that
the Court of Special Appeals distinguished Rivera from that decision. Id.
184. Id. at 454.
185. Id. (quoting Rivera v. Prince George's County Health Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212, 1225 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1994)).
186. Id. at 455.
187. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 455 (quoting Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 92 (E.D.N.Y.
1995)).
188. Id. at 456.
189 Id at 456-57
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Q: Did you make a diagnosis of HELLP syndrome at 10:50?
A: 12:33 ....
Q: Was the telephone call [to Hopkins at 12:30], in your mind, Doctor,
made as a referral, or as a consultation or a combination? What is it?
A: Somewhat a combination.
Q: . .. if a consultant recommends something to you, and you are the
primary physician, you still make the decision with the hands on the
patient whether to do it or not?
A: I'm the one looking at the patient.
Q: You are the one looking at the patient. You are the one calling the
shots. If somebody told you this patient could go by ambulance, and
they are going to stop off at Easton for lunch, you might say I'm not
shipping this patient. The patient is unstable....
A: That's right.
Q: That is well within your discretion? You have the power to do
that?
A: That's true.
Q: Do you, Doctor, testify today that you told the Hopkins personnel
that this was, indeed, an emergency?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you tell the Hopkins people that you believed that this patient,
not that you believed, that you had made a diagnosis of severe pre-
eclampsia, and you believed the patient had HELLP syndrome?
A: Yes.
Q: Doctor [Khouzami] calls you at 1:20. Do you have any new
information by 1:20 to tell him?
A: Yes. Do you want me to read my note?
• . . Doctor [Khouzami] returned call, had been presented patient.
Urinary output 10 ccs last, so we are, obviously, with pre-eclampsia, we
developed - that is off the note. Blood pressure stable. I have the flow
sheet here just to clarify that. This was 1 o'clock. At 1 o'clock her
blood pressure is 160 over 87, 138 over 87. So it was in that range.
Patient remains lethargic secondary to Morphine. Dr. [Khouzami] feels
ground transport, (ambulance), acceptable, will arrange ASAP. That is
the note.190
190. Id.
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Judge Theime relied on this testimony to find that duty had not been
established because Dr. Gray made a full diagnosis of severe pre-enclampsia and
HELLP syndrome before he contacted Johns Hopkins or had any discussion with
Dr. Khouzami. 191 Underscoring its classification of Dr. Khouzami as a mere
consultative physician under the Rivera analysis, the court stated "Dr. Gray had
reached a firm conclusion regarding Ms. Sterling's condition and Dr. Khouzami
did nothing to add to this diagnosis of the patient or prepare a course of
treatment."' 192 Therefore, because Gray had finalized his diagnosis of Sterling's
symptoms before speaking with Khouzami, the court characterized the
conversation as a consultation rather then a prescription for a course of
treatment. 1 
93
Furthermore, the Court of Special Appeals also relied on other portions of
Dr. Gray's deposition testimony in its analysis. Dr. Gray proclaimed that he had
the final say on whether or not Sterling would be transferred. 194 In his words he
was "the one looking at the patient" and could "override anything that somebody
from Hopkins sa[id.]"' 95 The court believed that Dr. Gray therefore exercised
decision-making power independent from Dr. Khouzami and Johns Hopkins when
he chose to transfer Sterling.' 96 The court's characterization of this testimony
contributed to its determination that no genuine issue of material fact was in
dispute, allowing Johns Hopkins' motion for summary judgment to be granted.197
To counter Dr. Gray's deposition testimony and survive the motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff offered the deposition testimony of Dr.
Khouzami. 198 Dr. Khouzami stated in deposition that he would make the decision
as to whether Sterling would be transported to Johns Hopkins, and that he "gave
permission for the transport . . . [and] approved the transport based on the
information [he] had[.]"' 99 Furthermore, Dr. Khouzami's deposition testimony
also shows that he gave a diagnosis of severe pre-eclampsia as well and approved a
transfer of the patient. 20 0  The plaintiff argued that this deposition testimony
demonstrated a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact because Dr.
191. Id. at 457 ("Although Dr. Khouzami acknowledged that he, too, had rendered diagnoses of
pre-enclampsia with the HELLP complication, Dr. Gray had already reached these conclusions before
discussing the case with the Hopkins attending physician.").
192. Id.
193. Sterling, 802 A.2d, at 458.
194. Id. at 456. After questioning Dr. Gray at the deposition whether he could override anything
somebody from Hopkins said, he responded, "That's correct." Id.
195. Id. at 458.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 457-59.
198. Id. at 457.
199. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 457.
200. Id. (noting "[h]is deposition testimony also indicates that he rendered a diagnosis of severe
pre-eclampsia....").
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Khouzami's testimony communicated his acceptance of Sterling as a patient and
showed he participated in the prescription of a course of treatment.
201
Rejecting this argument, Judge Theime held that the deposition testimony did
not establish Dr. Khouzami had either accepted Sterling as a patient or prescribed a
202course of treatment. Instead, he reasoned "[n]otwithstanding Dr. Khouzami's
testimony, it was Dr. Gray, the physician with direct contact with Ms. Sterling,
who rendered the initial diagnoses in this case and who initiated contact with
Hopkins for transfer." 2° 3 In a sense, because the court believed Dr. Gray could
override any transport decision from Hopkins, it disregarded Dr. Khouzami's
statements at deposition. 20 4 Therefore, Dr. Khouzami's deposition testimony was
weakened, and did not demonstrate dispute of a genuine issue of material fact. In
short, the court concluded "Dr. Gray's acknowledgement that he had the final say
in making the decision to transfer Ms. Sterling constitutes a crucial factor in this
case which militates against the imposition of a duty of care on Dr. Khouzami and.
Johns Hopkins Hospital., 20 5 Even though Dr. Khouzami made the statements in
his deposition, he did not have decision-making authority as to the transfer.20 6
In addition, the court did not consider the selection method of transport
conclusive. 20 7 Even though Dr.Gray requested a helicopter, Sterling was taken
from the Eastern Shore to Baltimore by ambulance because Dr. Khouzami believed
it was appropriate and complied with the standard of care.20 8 This did not
contribute to finding that a duty by implication had arisen between Sterling and
Johns Hopkins Hospital.
In conclusion, the court held that there was no dispute as to any material fact,
and subsequently granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Johns
Hopkins.2 0 9  A physician-patient relationship had not been established, and
201. Id. The plaintiff essentially contended that the course of treatment in this case was the transfer
itself, and because Khouzami had agreed to the transfer and insisted on transport by ambulance, he was
prescribing a course of treatment. Therefore, the plaintiff argued this presented a dispute as to a
material fact; whether Khouzami was acting merely as a consultant without a duty to Sterling, or
conversely, as a doctor who had accepted her as a patient and was prescribing a course of treatment. Id.
202. Id. at 458.
203. Id. at 457-58.
204. Id. No doubt, the practical effect of the court's decision was to disregard the consultative
physician's statements. The court relied on Dr. Gray's decision making authority to override any of
Khouzami's recommendations. Id.
205. Sterling, 802 A.2d. at 458.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 457-58. (noting Dr. Gray was reluctant to send the patient by ambulance, but still made
the ultimate determination regarding how she would be transferred).
208. Id. The protocol for transfer in a situation where an individual is receiving a magnesium
sulfate drip calls for transport by ambulance. Id. at 443 n.5. Dr.Khouzami told Dr.Gray that an
ambulance would have been acceptable in this situation, even though Dr. Gray wanted Sterling to be
taken to Baltimore by helicopter. Id. at 457-58.
209. ld. at 458-59.
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therefore, Johns Hopkins did not owe Sterling a duty of care.2'0 As a policy matter
the court stated, "[w]e thus cannot assume that a hospital accepting a transfer owes
the same duties as the transferring hospital, as the accepting hospital is not
currently treating the patient and thus has not established a responsibility towards
the patient., 211 The Sterling opinion, therefore, held that an implied duty was not
created when Dr. Gray contacted Johns Hopkins hospital to facilitate transfer of
Ms. Sterling.
212
IV. STERLING, PRIOR CASE LAW, AND THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS
In Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed its position among the majority of jurisdictions, requiring that a doctor
affirmatively accept a patient by participating in treatment or diagnosis before duty
is created by an implied doctor-patient relationship. 21 3 Considering a case of first
impression, however, the court properly set precedent by restricting a physician-
patient relationship by implication in a transfer situation when the treating
physician remains free to exercise his own judgment and diagnosis is completed at
the time of consultation. Thus, the Court of Special Appeals respected the
historical theory underlying medical malpractice and avoided the danger of
expanding duty where a doctor has not fully accepted an individual into his care.
Sterling is important for issues surrounding medical malpractice because restricting
the factual situations that impose liability on doctors will decrease malpractice
insurance premiums, thus easing the current health care crisis.
The Court of Special Appeals Properly Affirmed Its Position Requiring an
Affirmative Act To Demonstrate Acceptance as a Patient
Nearly all jurisdictions recognize that medical malpractice involves
principles of both contract and tort law. 2 14  Perhaps moving away from the
historical basis in contract, however, the Mozingo case held that a duty may be
imposed even when a doctor has never accepted a patient.25 In Sterling, the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed its position among the majority of jurisdictions,
210. Id.
211. Sterling, 802 A.2d. at 459.
212. Id.
213. But see Mozingo v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1992).
214. See HARNEY, supra note II, at 8.
215. Mozingo, 415 S.E.2d at 347.
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21621stressing the Mozingo approach is incorrect. Much criticized,2 17 Mozingo relied
upon the doctor's on-call status as well as his stipulation that he was responsible
for supervising residents to find that a physician-patient relationship had been
established.2 8 Critics argue that the North Carolina Supreme Court betrayed the
contractual history of medical malpractice in Mozingo, because the doctor
performed all of the terms of his contract.2 '9 He was available when contacted and
immediately came to the hospital when called.220 Furthermore, opponents to the
Mozingo decision note that the court's decision excessively expanded the scope of
duty in North Carolina.22' Consequently, a physician in North Carolina would
have a duty to a patient whom he has never treated or examined.222
As a result, the court's decision in Mozingo has not been followed by many
other jurisdictions, and in some cases, has been expressly rejected. 23 Serving as a
strong example is the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Prosise v. Foster.
That case, as noted above, held that duty would not be imposed on the on-call
physician for a resident's misdiagnosis "because the evidence failed to show a
consensual relationship in which the patient's care was entrusted to the [on-call]
physician and the physician accepted the case. 224 As a result of the decision, the
Virginia high court followed Maryland, quoting heavily from Rivera.225  A
physician-patient relationship would not be created by implication "in the absence
of proof that the doctor had accepted the patient, or had been summoned for
consultation or treatment, 'unless the 'on-call' agreement between a hospital and a
216. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 449-51. Here, The Court of Special Appeals showed that many courts
have followed the analysis established in Rivera. Id.
217. See e.g., Glenn, supra note 12, at 769; see also Rivera v. Prince George's County Health
Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331 (Va. 2001).
218. See Mozingo. 415 S.E.2d at 344-45.
219. Glenn, supra note 12 at 769 ("In Mozingo, the terms of the contract between the doctor's
employer and the medical school stated that 'on call' physicians would remain available by telephone
and come to the hospital when needed. It is undisputed that Dr. Kazior was available for consultation
with the residents and that he departed immediately for the hospital upon hearing of Sandra Mozingo's
delivery complications. Therefore, the plaintiff should not have been able to maintain a cause of action
against the doctor based on a contort liability theory.") Glenn, supra note 12, at 769.
220. Glenn, supra note 12, at 769.
221. Glenn, supra note 12, at 770.
222. Glenn, supra note 12, at 771. Commentators have also pointed out other implications of
Mozingo, notably that "[b]ecause a party contracting with a hospital to care for patients will not be able
to determine the scope of his liability after Mozingo, he will not be eligible for summary judgment in
any case if a plaintiff asserts that the standard of care has not been met. Id. at 771.
223- See Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Rivera v.
Prince George's County Health Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Prosise v. Foster, 544
S.E.2d 331 (Va. 2001). Maryland and Virginia are two examples of states that expressly reject the
Mozingo standard.
224. Prosise, 544 S.E.2d at 334.
225. Id.
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physician provides otherwise.' 226 Requiring that a doctor affirmatively accept the
patient before a physician-patient relationship is created comports with the
contractual theory underlying medical malpractice claims.
227
The Sterling court noted the competing lines of cases in this area of the
law, 228 and maintained that Maryland was hesitant to follow the North Carolina
courts and expand duty through an implied physician-patient relationship merely
on the basis of on-call status.229  Thus, the Maryland precedent established in
Rivera and affirmed in Sterling appears to be the best reasoned approach, in accord
with many other jurisdictions.
The Court of Special Appeals Correctly Held an Implied Physician-Patient
Relationship Had Not Been Created in the Sterling Transfer Situation
Established case law outside of Maryland examining the creation of a
physician-patient relationship by implication influenced the Court of Special
Appeals in Sterling. Considering a case of first impression, the court properly set
precedent restricting the establishment of a physician-patient relationship by
implication in a transfer situation when the treating physician remains free to
exercise his own judgment and the diagnosis is completed. Such a holding was
consistent with the contractual principles of medical malpractice which guided the
230court's decision.
Sterling is consistent with cases highlighting the influence of contractual
principles, such as Lownsbury,23 1 where a physician-patient relationship only arises
if the consulting doctor has already assumed the responsibility of supervision
pursuant to a prior agreement. 232 In the supervisory fact scenario, when a doctor
has assumed full responsibility of treatment he should be prepared to accept the
full duty of that patient's care. Perhaps then, if a doctor does not have full
responsibility or control over a patient, the requisite physician-patient relationship
is not established because there is another doctor that may determine the course of
treatment. Considering this, the Sterling court may have illustrated it was adopting
such logic stating,
226. Sterling. 802 A.2d at 450 (citing Rivera, 649 A.2d at 1232).
227. See Sterling, 802 A.2d at 458-59.
228. Id. at 448-55.
229. Id. at 454-55.
230. See id. at 444 n.6.
231. Lownsbury v. Venture, 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
232. See id. at 363 (noting, "the determinative issue in this case is not whether Dr. Stover had any
contact with Lownsbury or the residents treating her, but whether and to what extent Dr. Stover
assumed the obligation to supervise the residents at Akron City Hospital.").
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We thus cannot assume that a hospital accepting a transfer owes the
same duties as the transferring hospital, as the accepting hospital is not
currently treating the patient and thus has not established a
responsibility towards the patient. Furthermore, the accepting hospital
is unable to examine the patient to make informed decisions. We will
not extend to such hospitals a duty of medical care where the patient
remains under the supervision and care of her treating or attending
physician.233
From this excerpt, Dr. Khouzami's relationship with the patient was
overpowered by Dr. Gray because Dr. Gray could have changed the course of
treatment at any time. The court explicitly noted that it would not find that a
physician-patient relationship was created by implication where "the patient
,,234remains under the supervision and care of her treating or attending physician.
In a sense, Dr. Khouzami could not accept Ms. Sterling as a patient until Dr. Gray
had relinquished control over her treatment plan. Quite possibly, the court
believed not having full authority over a patient weakens the assumption that the
patient is under that doctor's care. Therefore, in harmony with the historic
contractual and negligence principles of medical malpractice, the Court of Special
Appeals properly restricted duty and found that an implied relationship had not
been created.
In addition, the Sterling court also underscored the fact that an implied duty
had not arisen because Dr. Khouzami did not participate in the diagnosis of the
patient.235 To the court, when Dr. Gray spoke with Khouzami about the transfer, a
full diagnosis of pre-enclampsia and HELLP syndrome had been completed.236 Dr.
Khouzami did not make a diagnosis, but rather, only "confirmed . . . that the
treatment given was appropriate and agreed to a transfer of that patient., 237
(emphasis added) The Court of Special Appeals believed that confirmation of a
diagnosis did not qualify as a diagnosis itself. Such a holding is consistent with the
rule that a physician-patient relationship arises when the doctor makes a diagnosis
or prescribes a course of treatment. 23 8 Conversely, if a doctor does not diagnose a
patient or set forth a treatment plan, he has not yet accepted her as a patient and a
physician-patient relationship does not exist. Noting the specific facts of Sterling,
233. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 459.
234. Id.
235. Sterling, 802 A.2d at 458.
236. Id. at 457.
237. Id. at 458.
238. See Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App. 1993); Adams v. Via
Christi, 19 P.3d 132 (Kan. 2001). Although these cases are somewhat different factually (in Wheeler
the doctor was speaking with the nurse who relied on his treatment plan, Wheeler, 866 S.W.2d at 35, in
Adams a doctor-patient relationship was renewed, Adams, 19 P.3d at 141), the diagnosis in each
situation is what ultimately supported the finding that a duty had been created.
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the Court of Special Appeals rightly found that Dr. Khouzami did not have a duty
to Ms. Sterling because he acted more as a consultant rather than a doctor making a
diagnosis.
Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Khouzami prescribed a course of treatment, a
physician-patient relationship would still not have been created. 239 During the
telephone call, Dr. Gray and Dr. Khouzami discussed how the patient would be
transferred to Johns Hopkins. Although Dr. Gray initially requested an air lift, Dr.
Khouzami urged that transport by ambulance was sufficient and complied with the
standard of care. Potentially, Ms. Sterling's transfer by ambulance could be
regarded as prescribing a course of treatment. A plaintiff in Sterling's position
could argue that even though Dr. Gray could override Dr. Khouzami's plan for
transfer by ambulance, Dr. Gray relied on the plan because Dr. Khouzami was a
specialist practicing at a designated "High-Risk Maternal Consultation/Referral
Service. 24 ° Courts have held, however, that a duty is not created when the treating
physician relies on the advice of a specialist in formulating a treatment plan.241
Possibly anticipating this argument, the Court of Special Appeals properly
restricted the creation of an implied physician-patient relationship in Sterling, even
if Dr. Khouzami prescribed a course of treatment.
Furthermore, Sterling properly restricted duty through an implied physician-
patient relationship even though Dr. Khouzami had consented to accept Sterling as
a patient when she arrived. Initially, it could be argued that the Appellate Court of
Illinois in Reynolds v. Decatur Memorial Hospital suggested that duty may arise if
the doctor agrees to examine the patient at a later time. 242 Other courts, however
have expressly considered and rejected that approach to creating a physician-
patient relationship. In Irvin v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Kansas acknowledged
that the consulting physician had agreed to examine the patient in the morning, but
held that doing so did not amount to accepting the individual as a patient.
243
Therefore, no physician-patient relationship was created.244  Similarly, Dr.
Khouzami agreed to accept Sterling once she arrived at Hopkins. 245 Although the
Court of Special Appeals did not specifically consider that argument, it was correct
in restricting duty under the facts of Sterling bearing the Irvin decision in mind.
239. See McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). Although the
McKinney three-prong test has been abandoned, courts still recognize that a duty may be created either
when the doctor makes a diagnosis or when he prescribes a course of treatment. See, e.g., Sterling, 802
A.2d at 448.
240. See Sterling, 802 A.2d at 441-42.
241. See Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (suggesting it was
inconsequential that the treating physical contacted the defendant, a specialist, and the treating
physician "would not have overridden" the specialist). Id. at 168.
242. See Reynolds v. Decatur Mem'l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Il. App. 1996).
243. Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 942, 944 (Kan. 2001).
244. Id. at 943
245. See Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 442-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
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The Impact of Sterling on Public Policy and the Medical Malpractice Crisis
The Court of Special Appeals avoided the danger of expanding duty in
medical malpractice litigation by restricting the creation of duty through an implied
physician-patient relationship. Across the nation, medical malpractice litigation is
among the most vigorously contested issues. Observers are concerned that
increasing jury awards raise both the cost of malpractice insurance as well as
health care costs overall.246 Consequently, many protest that various measures of
tort reform are necessary, such as damage caps or enterprise liability for hospitals
rather than individualized liability for doctors.247 The insurance industry claims
that the rise in rates is due to an increase in malpractice litigation and jury awards
in the millions of dollars.248 Others, especially the plaintiffs' bar, place blame on
large insurance companies, contending,
Much of the extraordinary increase has come after a multiple year bear
market that played havoc with the forecasts of so many financial
products companies .... Medical malpractice insurers used their pools
of reserve cash to invest aggressively during the 1990's. This allowed
the insurance carriers to lower premiums, based on the erroneous belief
that the market would stay high. According to this theory, when the
market dropped, this poor planning resulted in sharply increasing
premiums
249
Exactly who is to blame for the current state of affairs is unclear. Most
likely, it is a combination of these factors that influence the malpractice premiums
doctors pay annually.2 5 0  Regardless of which is the strongest factor, the issue
threatens to harm doctors, patients, and lawyers.
Largely, one's opinion on which actor is the cause of the so-called medical
malpractice crisis may depend on how one balances public policy concerns against
the individual plaintiff, as well as partisan loyalties. Generally stated, the "public
246. Robert Ward Shaw, Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: An Economic Evaluation, 81
N.C. L. REV. 2371, 2377 (2003).
247. Id. at 2378; Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1994) "One
malpractice reform proposal that has gained prominence in the 1990s is enterprise medical liability.
Under this approach the focus of medical malpractice litigation would be shifted from individual
physicians to the health care organizations under whose auspices patients are treated." Abraham &
Weiler, supra at 381.
248. Shaw, supra note 246, at 2378 (quoting Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Rates Are Rising
Sharply: Health Costs Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at AI).
249. Shaw, supra note 246, at 2379.
250. Shaw, supra note 246, at 2379.
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policy rationale considers the greater good of the medical liability system over the
fact-specific situation of each individual plaintiff," which a jury considers. 251 Each
group has different goals in assessing pain and suffering, as jurors will grant
damages based on the harm to that specific plaintiff, while legislators are
concerned with the effect on the community as a whole.2 52 Public policy issues
such as ensuring that standards of medical care remain high and that doctors are
available and able to practice medicine in the communities of individual states are
issues of great importance in state capitals.
Recognizing the impact of increased medical malpractice liability on the
public, many courts have stressed that policy concerns are of great importance
when deciding exactly when duty may be established.253 The Sterling decision will
impact medical malpractice litigation because it may reduce the number of
plaintiffs who are able to establish the duty element in their prima facie case. In
Sterling, the court set a high standard for establishing a physician-patient
relationship by implication in a transfer situation. As long as the treating doctor
has the final say, a duty will not be imposed on the doctor at the transferee hospital
even if he prescribes a course of treatment or refers to the individual as "his
patient." Such a holding is especially significant in a transfer situation because
discussion between doctors often takes place over the telephone.2 54  If the court
held that a plaintiff could always establish duty through a telephone conversation
like the one in Sterling, "the consequence of such a role would be significant. It
would have a chilling effect on [the] practice of medicine. It would stifle
communication, education, and professional association, all to the detriment of the
,,255patient.
Heeding further concerns, if duty had been created in Sterling, transferee
hospitals such as Johns Hopkins may be less willing to discuss a patient's
symptoms or even accept a transfer patient for treatment. Although one court has
countered that restricting implied duty allows physicians to escape liability, 56 the
weight of policy concerns seems to bear against defining duty in a broad sense,
rather than taking a more narrow approach. Taking a global (rather than
individualized) view of the impact of medical malpractice case law, it seems that
stifling communication and transfers between hospitals would be a greater evil to
25 1. Elizabeth Stewart Poisson, Addressing the Impropriety of Statutory Caps on Pain and
Suffering Awards in the Medical Liability System, 82 N.C. L. REv. 759, 780 (2004).
252. Id.
253. Id.; see e.g., Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
254. E.g. Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 943 (Kan. 2001).
255. Id. at 943 (quoting Reynolds v. Decatur Mem'l Hosp., 660 N.E. 2d 235, 240 (I1. App. 1996)).
256. McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (noting "[w]e find that
the lack of direct contact between the patient and the on-call physician does not, in itself, preclude a
physician-patient relationship. To find otherwise would allow on-call cardiologists and kindred
specialists who, with a duty to do so, provide what one could term 'indirect medical care' to escape all
liability even after rendering a diagnosis and prescribing a course of treatment.").
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avoid rather than allowing a few doctors to escape liability in limited situations. 2 57
Thus, in Sterling the Court of Special Appeals correctly restricted duty by
implication particularly in light of the important public policy concerns at issue.
In addition, Sterling will positively impact public policy issues not expressly
considered in the decision. Currently, physicians face high malpractice insurance
premiums, forcing many doctors to relocate or stop practicing altogether. 258
Statistics from Maryland also illustrate this trend.259 The organization that insures
most doctors in Maryland, the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society, has
increased its rates by 28 percent over the past year, and is considering premium
increases this summer of as much as 40 to 50 percent. 260  Possibly noting these
difficulties, the Court of Special Appeals may have restricted duty arising from an
implied physician-patient relationship to increase the difficulty of making a
medical malpractice claim. If no physician-patient relationship has been formed,
then no duty can be imposed on the doctor.261 As a result, a plaintiff would not be
able to meet the first element of the prima facie case in a medical malpractice
suit.
262
Consistent with this theory, making it more difficult to bring a claim would
potentially decrease the number of successful suits against doctors. If claims are
reduced, the cost of malpractice insurance may be lowered. Also motivated to
combat rising premiums, political leaders have begun to introduce legislation
focused on helping doctors and the health care sector.263 Maryland's Governor,
Robert Ehrlich, proposed legislation in 2004 that "include[d] some limits on
lawyers [sic] fees and restrictions on the way economic damages are computed..
257. Discouraging communication would hinder the practice of medicine greatly, especially in areas
where communication and transfer between hospitals is essential. The competing policy concern,
allowing negligent doctors to escape liability because an implied duty was not established, may also
create problems because doctors may lower their standard of care realizing that they may not be held
liable in discussing a transfer situation over the phone. This, however, would be less widespread than
an expansion of duty where a "chilling effect" would befall the practice of medicine.
258. Bush Argues for Cap on Medical Malpractice Awards, MANAGED CARE WKLY DIG., Aug. 26,
2002, available at 2002 WL 25803333. The article points out that President Bush is a proponent of tort
reform in medical malpractice suits. The intended goal is to decrease jury awards, which will in turn
decrease malpractice insurance premiums. Some claim that the nation's health care industry faces an
impending crisis as "the result has been closed practices and rising healthcare costs overall as doctors
defensively prescribe unnecessary tests and treatments, and fewer physicians entering high-risk areas."
Id.
259. Maryland Governor To Propose Limits on Claims, HEALTH & MED. WK.,, Dec. 1, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 65966149; Tom Ramstack, Doctors' Careers on Life Support, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.washtimes.com/business/2003031 - 10245-9582r.htm (last visited
June 10, 2004).
260. Maryland Governor To Propose Limits on Claims, supra note 259; Vaishali Honawar, Special
Session for Malpractice Law?, THE CAPITAL, June 9, 2004, at Al.
261. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 444-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
262. Id.
263. See Bush Argues for Capon Medical Malpractice Awards, supra note 258.
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,,264 The proposal died on the Maryland Senate floor, but Erlich plans to continue
to make the legislation a priority. 265  Although doctors and lawyers differ on
exactly who is to blame for high malpractice premiums, 266 some argue decreasing
the amount of claims paid to plaintiffs alleviates some of the high insurance
costs. 2 67 Faced with such issues gaining national attention and a world where
communication between doctors occurs freely and through a variety of channels,
courts are forced to refine their theories of duty by implication. In this
environment, Sterling may forestall expanding medical malpractice liability in
situations where it is argued that duty is created through an implied physician-
patient relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
In closing, Sterling may demonstrate that restricting duty through an implied
physician-patient relationship in a transfer situation limits the malpractice liability
of physicians in Maryland. The degree to which the Sterling decision serves to
limit medical liability remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that if duty is not
proven the prima facie case of a medical malpractice suit cannot survive and the
defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Intuitively then, by
limiting the factual scenarios that evince the creation of a physician-patient
relationship, the number of claims that survive summary judgment will decrease.
Considering the potential impact of Sterling, not much scholarly discussion
exists regarding the creation of duty as a result of an implied physician-patient
relationship. For now, Sterling's reasoning does not seemed threatened because
the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied Sterling's petition of certiorari. 268 With
many physicians leaving practice around the country due to high insurance costs,
protecting doctors in the context of transfer situations is particularly important, as
patients are freely transferred within the same region to different facilities that
provide specialized care. Nevertheless, Sterling stands as an important case
serving to limit the liability of doctors in Maryland.
264. Maryland Governor to Propose Limits on Claims, supra note 259.
265. Honawar, supra note 260.
266. Kenneth Jost, Medical Malpractice: Are Lawsuits Out of Control?, CQ WKLY., Mar. 15, 2003,
at 640. Doctors charge that the legal system, which allows the filing of too many meritless claims, is to
blame for high malpractice insurance rates. Lawyers argue that it is not the legal system, but the
insurance companies, who "raise medical liability premiums to offset low returns on investments."
267. See id.
268. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002), cert. denied, 808
A.2d 808 (Md. 2002).
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